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Quantum bit commitment (QBC) is insecure in the standard non-relativistic quantum crypto-
graphic framework, essentially because Alice can exploit quantum steering to defer making her
commitment. Two assumptions in this framework are that: (a) Alice knows the ensembles of evi-
dence E corresponding to either commitment; and (b) system E is quantum rather than classical.
Here, we show how relaxing assumption (a) or (b) can render her malicious steering operation in-
determinable or inexistent, respectively. Finally, we present a secure protocol that relaxes both
assumptions in a quantum teleportation setting. Without appeal to an ontological framework, we
argue that the protocol’s security entails the reality of the quantum state, provided retrocausality
is excluded.
I. INTRODUCTION
Bit commitment (BC) is a cryptographic mistrust-
ful task between two adversarial parties Alice and Bob,
wherein Alice commits a bit a by submitting as evidence
a quantum system, possibly after multiple rounds of com-
munication between them, and later she unveils a. The
security requirement is that the evidence must be bind-
ing on her, while hiding a from Bob until her unveiling.
BC is important because it can serve as a primitive for
important crypto-tasks, among them coin flipping, obliv-
ious transfer, secure multi-party computation, signature
schemes and zero-knowledge proofs. Except by invok-
ing computational assumptions, a trusted third party, or
relativistic constraints on signaling [1–6], secure BC is
conventionally not believed to be possible.
We briefly recapitulate a version of the standard in-
security argument against (nonrelativistic) quantum BC
(QBC) [7–9]. Suppose Eα ≡ {|χ˜αj 〉 =
√
pαj |χαj 〉} denotes
the ensemble of un-normalized states of the evidence, cor-
responding to Alice’s commitment to bit α, which Alice
submits to Bob. For her commitment to be concealed
from Bob, it is required that
ρ0B = ρ
1
B, (1)
where ραB =
∑
j |χ˜αj 〉〈χ˜αj | and α ∈ {0, 1}. To cheat, Alice
submits the second register of the purification
|Ψ〉 ≡
∑
j
|φ0j 〉|χ˜0j〉 (2)
as her evidence system, where |φ0j〉 are elements of an
orthonormal basis. To unveil α = 0, she measures the
first register in the basis {|φ0j 〉} at unveiling time and
announces the outcome j. To unveil α = 1, she steers
[10] E into the ensemble E1 before measurement, i.e., she
measures the first register in the basis {|φ1j 〉 = U|φ0j〉},
where matrix U ≡ {Ujk} is defined by
|χ˜0k〉 =
∑
j
Ujk|χ˜1j〉, (3)
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i.e., the unitary linking the two ensembles [11]. In sum-
mary, perfect concealment against Bob allows Alice to
cheat by remotely steering Bob’s state to either ensemble.
More generally, relaxing Eq. (1), we may let ρB0 ≃ ρB1 ,
which would correspondingly diminish Alice’s ability to
cheat.
Interestingly, an analogous attack on a toy bit commit-
ment protocol using steering correlations can be demon-
strated [12] in the toy theory due to Spekkens [13], which
features steering but not nonlocality.
In response to the steering attack, various works have
studied cheat sensitive QBC, where Bob’s security re-
quirement is relaxed by letting ρB0 6= ρB1 (cf. [14], and
references therein). But others have questioned whether
this framework of mistrustful quantum cryptography is
broad enough to truly rule out secure QBC (see [15–21]
and references therein), and our work lends credence to
this point of view. A key observation in these works
is that, unlike (say) the no-cloning or no-signaling theo-
rems, the no-go argument for (non-relativistic) QBC does
not seem to invoke a simple and broad physical principle,
and thus appears to be tied to a specific framework.
Our point of departure is to draw attention to two as-
sumptions implicit in the no-go theorems in the standard
framework:
Assumption (a): That Alice knows the two final en-
sembles .
Assumption (b): Quantumness of the evidence E.
Our approach is to explore the possibility of securing
QBC protocols by relaxing these two assumptions.
Regarding Assumption (a), consider a QBC protocol in
which Alice lacks full knowledge of {|χ˜αj 〉}, say because
the two ensembles are determined through secret choices
of Bob. Her ignorance may prevent her from computing
the cheat unitary U , in view of Eq. (3). But, it may well
end up over-empowering Bob. Thus, we want a proto-
col that relaxes Assumption (a), but with safeguards to
guarantee the concealingness of evidence E, essentially
via secrecy injected by Alice. Thus, we expect such a
possible protocol to be “double-blind”. These ideas are
discussed in, and form the basis of our protocol P1 in,
Section II.
2Regarding Assumption (b), a QBC protocol in which
evidence E is fully classical is trivially protected against
the steering attack of [7–9]. At first sight, the classicality
of E would appear to reduce such a protocol to a classi-
cal bit commitment scheme [22], for which information-
theoretic arguments exist prohibiting unconditional secu-
rity. However, irrespective of the security status of QBC
protocol obtained by relaxing Assumption (b), it is clear
that such a reduction is not the case, given that there
will be intermediate stages involving quantum commu-
nication and quantum operations. It may be helpful to
think of the QBC protocol with a classical evidence E,
as one that implements a “classical-valued quantum one-
way function”, i.e., an operation with a classical output,
whose difficulty to invert comes from quantum nonclas-
sicality, rather than from computational complexity.
Classical bit commitment based a one-way function
f works as follows: Alice computes f(Kpriv,Kpub, a),
where Kpriv,Kpub and a are Alice’s private key,
public key and commitment. She submits E =
{f(Kpriv,Kpub, a),Kpub} as her evidence. Later, at the
unveiling stage, she submits the message {Kpriv, a}. Bob
accepts her commitment after checking that it reproduces
E. This is only computationally secure, since with suf-
ficient computational resources, Bob could invert E to
derive a.
In the proposed quantum realization of the
classical-valued one-way function f , the basic
idea is that this function will have the form
g = f(Kpub,Kpriv, Lpub, Lpriv, a), where Lpub and
Lpriv are the public and private inputs of Bob, and the
output of f is generally probabilistic. Unlike in classical
bit commitment, here all inputs of Alice and Bob consist
in general of quantum state preparations, rotations and
measurements. The hope is that the privacy of Bob’s
input will bind Alice, while the privacy of Alice’s input
will provide the requisite one-wayness to conceal the
commitment. Thus, as with relaxing Assumption (a),
we require the double-blindness feature. These ideas are
discussed in, and form the basis of our protocol P2 in
Section III.
In summary, with both protocols P1 and P2, Alice is
unable to launch the steering-based attack, though for
different reasons. In protocol P1, this happens because
Alice can’t determine the malicious operation U required
to steer Bob’s ensemble, whereas in protocol P2, this
happens because no such U exists. As it turns out, P1 is
still vulnerable to a less devastating, probabilistic attack
by Alice, based on her superposing her commit actions.
As a result, protocol P1 lacks certification of classicality
(CC) [23]. On the other hand, P2 is secure even in this
stronger (CC) scenario, and is our main proposal.
With a foundational objective in mind, we propose pro-
tocol P3 in Section IV, which is an extension of P2, to-
gether with the use of entanglement. The security of
protocol P3 is shown to demonstrate the reality of the
quantum state, under the exclusion of retrocausality.
II. PROTOCOL P1, AND THE
STEERING-BASED ATTACK
A BC protocol has three phases: a commit phase, at
the end of which Alice submits an evidence of her having
committed to a specfic value a; a holding phase, during
which her commitment remains valid; finally, an unveil
phase, where she opens her commitment, and reveals sup-
porting information.
The commit and unveil phases of protocol P1 are
as follows. A holding phase of arbitrary duration be-
tween these two phases is, in principle, allowed. Al-
though protocol P1 requires quantum memory for the
holding phase, yet with a slight modification, this can
be avoided. The protocol makes use of quantum en-
cryption, which is the task whereby n qubits can be
maximally mixed using 2n bits of a random private key
[24]. This relies on the fact that given any qubit state ρ,
1
4 (ρ+XρX +Y ρY +ZρZ) = I/2, where X,Y and Z are
the Pauli operators. Here, we use the notation wherein
|0〉 and |1〉 are the eigenstates of the Pauli Z operator,
while |±〉 are eigenstates of Pauli X .
Commit phase: (C1)P1 Bob transmits to Alice 2n
“single-blind” (i.e., unknown to Alice) random qubit
states |φ(α)j 〉 ∈ {|0〉, |1〉, |±〉}, where α ∈ {0, 1}, 0 ≤ j <
n, indicating the two sets to her. (Alternatively, he could
submit halves of Bell states, deferring measurement in X
or Z basis on the “home” qubits until later.) Addition-
ally, he supplies Q extra qubits prepared in pure states
unknown to her (or as halves of singlets), where Q≫ n.
(C2)P1 Alice prepares Q “decoy” qubits by quantum en-
crypting the states of the extra qubits. We denote the
2Q bits of encryption information RQ. To commit to bit
a, she inserts the n states |φ(a)j 〉 at positions W among
the Q decoys, and then rearranges all n+Q qubits using
permutation P . (C3)P1 She transmits back to Bob these
n+Q qubits as evidence E of her commitment.
Unveil phase: (U1)P1 Alice announces a, P , RQ and
positionsW . She returns the n qubits of her non-commit
state |φ(a)j 〉. (U2)P1 Bob extracts the n commit qubits
from evidence E using information P and W . He verifies
that they are the states |φ(a)j 〉. Further, he verifies that
the n non-commit qubits returned in step (U1)P1 are the
states |φ(a)j 〉. Finally, using information P and RQ, he
checks that the Q decoys are indeed the extra qubits sent
by him. 
The protocol assumes the availability of quantum
memory. However, this is not essential. As in the BB84
protocol [25], Bob can measure, just after the commit
phase ends, each evidence qubit j in a BB84 basis (X
or Z). When Alice opens her commitment, he verifies
that there is outcome agreement on all qubits where her
measurement basis j matches that of the preparation of
|φ(a)j 〉. Overall, this doesn’t affect the following security
agruments, except to roughly halve the security parame-
ter from n to n2 .
Consider the security against Bob. Intuitively, the
3large number of Alice’s decoy qubits swamp the rela-
tively small number of coding qubits |φ(a)j 〉, making it
impossible for him to determine a. More quantatively,
until Alice’s announcement of the information P and W
in (U1)P1, the state of the evidence is
ρaB = CW

⊗
j
(
|φ(a)j 〉 〈φ(a)j |
)
⊗
[
I
2
]⊗Q , (4)
where CW represents the uniform mixture over all
(
Q+n
n
)
combinations of interpolating the n scrambled qubits
|φ(a)j 〉 among the Q decoy qubits inserted by Alice. We
note that from Bob’s viewpoint, all decoys inserted by Al-
ice are in the state I2 . Clearly, for any given n, the state
ρ0B approaches ρ
1
B closer for larger Q, thereby allowing
satisfaction of Eq. (1) to any required degree.
We indicate this showing that ρaB, for either a, can be
made arbitrarily close to
(
I
2
)(n+Q)
in Q in terms of the
fidelity F (Q,n). Then, in view of Eq. (4), for given n
and sufficiently large Q ≫ n, it follows (Appendix A)
that the fidelity F (Q,n) ≡ F
(
ρaB,
(
I
2
)⊗(Q+n))
satisfies
F (Q,n) ≥ 1− 2−Q(1−H(n/Q)), (5)
whereH(x) = −x log(x)−(1−x) log)1−x) is the Shannon
binary entropy. For a given n, fidelity F (Q,n) is thus
seen to approach unity exponentially fast as Q increases,
meaning that Bob can hardly find out a. Even though
Bob knows |φ(0)j 〉 and |φ(1)j 〉 for each j, Alice’s evidence for
either commit bit is close to I/2. There is no advantage
for Bob even if he transmits halves of Bell state |Φ+〉 ≡
1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉) since under Alice’s method of concealing
her commitment by inserting decoys is symmetric to any
choice of states he makes.
As regards security against Alice, crucial to protection
from the steering attack is the fact that both ensembles
Eα are unknown to Alice because of the single-blindness
feature, i.e., the dropping of assumption (a). But, as we
noted earlier, merely Alice’s ignorance of the ensembles
Eα may not guarantee that she can’t determine U .
To see this, the situation can be formalized as fol-
lows: Bob prepares and sends to Alice an unknown-to-her
(“single-blind”) state ξ. Alice then returns to Bob an ele-
ment of the ensemble Ta(ξ) (α ∈ {0, 1}) as evidence. As
Bob varies the blind information ξ, clearly the two en-
sembles Tα(ξ) are also rotated in some way. In general,
T0(ξ) and T1(ξ) need not be indistinguishable under ar-
bitrary variation of ξ.
However, with the indistinguishability condition Eq.
(1), the ensembles corresponding to T0(ξ) and T1(ξ) in-
deed co-rotate in such a way that the steering unitary U
linking them is invariant.
To prove this, we allow for the encoding ensembles to
be randomly chosen by Bob, say through a secret pa-
rameter µ he holds, i.e., Eα|µ ≡ {V αµ |χ˜αj 〉}, for unitaries
V αµ . Alice has a quantum computer, which entangles the
evidence system with an auxilliary system she holds, in
such a way that it realizes the positive operator-valued
measure (POVM) that generates the ensemble |χ˜αj 〉 for
any commitment α she chooses.
If Bob applies his secret transformation, then gener-
ated ensemble is correspondingly rotated. Now if V 0µ 6=
V 1µ , then in general, this would imply that∑
j
V 0µ |χ˜0j〉 〈χ˜0j |V 0†µ 6=
∑
j
V 1µ |χ˜1j 〉 〈χ˜1j |V 1†µ , (6)
even if ρ0B ≡
∑
j |χ˜0j〉 〈χ˜0j | =
∑
j |χ˜1j 〉 〈χ˜1j | ≡ ρ1B , as per
Eq. (1). Therefore, in general, to order to preserve indis-
tinguishablity Eq. (1) when µ is varied, we require that
the two ensembles be rotated identitcally, i.e.,
V 0µ = V
1
µ ≡ Vµ. (7)
Bob’s random choice of µ could be represented
through a purification, whereby we replace |Ψ〉 in
Eq. (2) by
∑
µ
√
qµ |bµ〉 |Ψµ〉 ≡
∑
µ
√
qµ |bµ〉Vµ |Ψ〉 ≡∑
j,µ
√
qµ |bµ〉 |φ0j〉Vµ|χ˜0j〉, and Bob holds the first register,
which he measures in the {|bµ〉} basis earlier or later. It
follows from this and Eq. (3) that each Ujk is unchanged
and therefore that the same cheat operator U works for
any Vµ. This is so even if Bob measures his entangled reg-
ister later. Therefore, a straightforward extension of the
standard QBC framework to allow for ensembles Eα to
depend on Bob’s private choices, doesn’t automatically
protect QBC against the steering attack (cf. [26, 27]).
But in the present case, the states chosen for |φ(0)j 〉
and those chosen for |φ(1)j 〉 are independent and random,
with Alice’s insertion of decoy qubits ensuring Eq. (1)
to an arbitrary degree, with ραB ≃ I/2 for both values
of α. Therefore, Eq. (7) is not a necessary condition.
Each random and independent choice of |Φ(0)〉 and |Φ(1)〉
would, in general, determine a different U in Eq. (3),
which Alice doesn’t know, and hence is unable to deploy.
Finally, we note that protocol P1 is secure against sim-
pler attacks. Suppose Alice tries the trivial attack of in-
serting both |φ(0)j 〉 and |φ(1)k 〉 among the decoys and tries
to unveil what she pleases. She will indeed be able to
unveil the commit state |φ(a)j 〉 correctly, but be unable
to produce the required non-commit state |φak〉 having
already included it among the decoys, and also be un-
able (with probability exponentially close to 1 in n) to
convince Bob that these purported decoys are prepared
using the extra qubits he had sent.
The requirement that her decoys should be created by
randomizing his extra qubits also helps thwart a port-
based teleportation (PBT) attack by her. Recall that
PBT is a task wherein she can teleport (asymptotically)
deterministically a qubit to port k randomly picked out
of many entanglement output ports on Bob’s side [28, 29].
Alice might try to send Bob halves of singlets instead of
the honest decoys, and then implement PBT on either
|φ(0)j 〉 or |φ(1)k 〉 during the unveiling phase. While she
4can indeed achieve this asymptotically, she will fail (with
probability exponentially close to 1 in Q) to convince Bob
that the states of qubits in the other ports than k were
indeed prepared from the extra qubits he had supplied.
Lastly, suppose she performs the honest commitment
operation for a = 0 and naively tries to unveil a = 1,
or vice versa, then the probability that she can escape
his check in step (U2)P1 in general vanishes or is expo-
nentially small in n, since the fidelity of the two possible
encoding states is Πn−1j=0 |〈φ(0)j |φ(1)j 〉|2.
Interestingly, despite being impervious to the steering
attack, protocol P1 does not offer a “certificate of clas-
sicality” (CC) [23], i.e., the probabilities pa to unveil a
only satisfy the weaker condition p0+ p1 = 1 [23], rather
than the stronger requirement that precisely one of p0
and p1 should be 1 and other 0.
The reason is that Alice would be able to launch an at-
tack, wherein she creates a superposition of the two com-
mit actions by entangling the quantum computer per-
forming them, with a suitably prepared auxiliary. We
shall refer to this as the “superposition attack”. Although
less devastating than the steering attack, clearly it is
more persistent.
In this attack on protocol P1, Alice prepares an aux-
iliary A′ in the state 1√
2
(γ0|0〉A′ + γ1|1〉A′), and through
a joint interaction with all 2n qubits received from Bob
plus A′, produces the state:
1∑
a=0
γa|a〉A′ ⊗ |Φ(a)〉keep ⊗ |Φ(a)〉encrypt, (8)
where
∑
a |γa|2 = 1 and the subscripts “keep” and “en-
crypt” refer to the action of retaining state |Φ(a)〉 and
transmitting the system corresponding to |Φ(a)〉 after in-
sertion of decoys, respectively. Alice measures register
A′ just before unveiling, leading to either a = 0 or a = 1
being chosen randomly, with probability |γa|2.
This lack of CC of the commit bit is a feature shared
with some other proposed QBC protocols, such as the
relativistic BC protocols [1–6] and also [15, 16]. In prac-
tice, it is questionable whether a dishonest Alice would
opt for such a random cheat strategy in a stand-alone
application of bit commitment, but the fact remains that
the protocol doesn’t bind her to commit deterministi-
cally, which undermines the composability of this QBC
protocol in a larger application, which may require the
commitment to have a specific classical value.
We next present protocol P2, that closes the above se-
curity gap, essentially by relaxing Assumption (b) men-
tioned in Section I as being implicit in the standard
framework. Obviously, neither the steering attack nor
the superposition attack would be possible if the two
system E is classical, typically encoding classical infor-
mation based on outcomes of a measurement determined
by her commitment. We stress that the evidence E, al-
though by itself classical, is generated by quantum op-
erations (which are restricted by nonclassical features
such as non-commutation, no-cloning, measurement dis-
turbance, etc.), so that the present protocol won’t be re-
ducible to a purely classical BC (which is known, by clas-
sical information theoretic arguments, to guarantee only
computational, and not unconditional, security [22].)
But this would seem to endanger the concealment
against Bob. To fight this threat, Alice must initially
prepare the states. However, this would introduce the
new threat of Alice’s taking advantage of her prepara-
tion knowledge. Therefore, Bob must randomize these
states in some way. Thus the encoding states should be
“double-blind”, unknown to both Alice and Bob. These
are the considerations behind the following protocol.
III. PROTOCOL P2, AND THE
SUPERPOSITION-BASED ATTACK
The scheme P2 can be considered (as noted in Section
I)) as a classical-valued quantum realization of a (prob-
abilistic) one-way function. The commit and unveiling
phases are as follows, with an intervening holding phase
of arbitrary duration. Even from a practical standpoint,
there is no time constraint on the storage of the evidence,
since it is classical.
Commit phase: (C1)P2 Alice transmits to Bob 2n
qubits randomly prepared in states |ψk〉 ∈ {|0〉, |1〉, |±〉}.
(C2)P2 Bob randomizes their bases (by randomly apply-
ing either identity I or Hadamard H to each of them),
randomizes their bits by quantum encryption, and finally
also randomly scrambles the qubits according to some
permutation operation P . (C3)P2 Bob transmits to Al-
ice these double-blind states, denoted |φj〉. (C4)P2 Alice
picks out n of the transmitted states, and asks Bob to
reveal his randomizing operations for these qubits. Upon
receiving this information, she verifies that they are in-
deed qubits she had prepared. These n check qubits are
discarded. (C5)P2 To commit to bit a = 0 (resp., a = 1),
she measures the remaining n states |φj〉 in the basis Z
(resp., X). The n-bit random outcome string is denoted
M . (C6)P2 She announcesM as evidence of her commit-
ment.
Unveil phase: (U1)P2 Alice announces a and her
preparation information of the qubits |ψk〉. (U2)P2 From
the latter, Bob obtains complete classical knowledge of
all 2n states |φj〉. (U3)P2 Bob verifies that the string M
is compatible with the measurement of states |φj〉 in the
basis Z (resp., X) if a = 0 (resp., a = 1).
Consider the security against Bob. Prior to the unveil
phase, he has no classical information about the prepa-
ration of |ψj〉, and hence of |φk〉, which is derived from
|ψj〉 via random rotations and rearrangements, but with-
out measurements. Therefore, knowledge of the stringM
reveals to him nothing about a. Let R denote the clas-
sical information about Bob’s randomization operations
in step (C2)P2 and H(·|·) classical conditional entropy.
Then P2 satisfies the condition:
H(α|M,R) = 1, (9)
5where α is the commitment random variable. Eq. (9)
replaces Eq. (1) as the condition of security against Bob
appropriate to this scenario. Bob can’t substitute his
own states in step (C3)P2, nor measure Alice’s qubits,
since such actions would generate disturbance that would
almost certainly be detected in check (C4)P2, where Alice
verifies that Bob has returned her own qubits after a
unitary and rearrangement operation.
As to security against Alice, she can’t launch a steer-
ing attack or even a superposition attack for the triv-
ial reason that her commit evidence is now classical in-
formation, and thus is in principle unsteerable and un-
superimposable. In other words, a malicious steering op-
eration U simply doesn’t exist. This stands in contrast
to the situation with protocol P1, where the operation U
does exist, but Alice can’t ascertain it.
Of course, other forms of attacks must be considered.
Intuitively, security against Alice comes from the fact
that because of her ignorance of R, she is maximally ig-
norant of the states by measuring which she generates
string M . Thus she can’t confidently unveil a fake mea-
surement basis. Now, even without the scrambling ac-
tion, the basis and bit randomizations ensure that Alice
has no information about the returned state |φj〉. How-
ever, given her initial preparation in step (C1)P2 and her
final measurement in step (C5)P2, Alice can launch a lo-
cal entanglement based attack of the following kind.
In step (C1)P2 she sends to Bob half a singlet |Φ+〉 =
1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉). Her singlet will now have been modified
through Bob’s actions according to
Bob’s action Alice’s state
II, IZ |00〉 ± |11〉
IX, IY |01〉 ± |10〉
HI,HX |0+〉 ± |1−〉
HZ,HY |0−〉 ± |1+〉 ,
(10)
where the normalization factor has been dropped out. In
step (C5)P2, Alice measures in the standard Bell basis
{|00〉 ± |11〉 , |01〉 ± |10〉}. Suppose she finds outcome
|00〉 − |11〉. From Eq. (10) it follows that Bob could
not have applied the three operations: II, IX, IY .
Now the four honest states that would result under
Bob’s eight possible randomization actions are:
Bob |0〉 |1〉 |+〉 |−〉
II |0〉 |1〉 |+〉 |−〉
IX |1〉 |0〉 |+〉 |−〉
IY |1〉 |0〉 |−〉 |+〉
IZ |0〉 |1〉 |−〉 |+〉
HI |+〉 |−〉 |0〉 |1〉
HX |+〉 |−〉 |1〉 |0〉
HY |−〉 |+〉 |1〉 |0〉
HZ |−〉 |+〉 |0〉 |1〉
(11)
Note that only the last five rows in Eq. (11) are applica-
ble in this case. Alice can announce an arbitrary bit as
her measurement outcome in step (C6)P2, say Mj = 0.
Then, to unveil a = 0 (resp., a = 1), she must claim
|ψj〉 = |0〉 (resp., |ψj〉 = |−〉), since this would be consis-
tent with her having applied any of these five operations,
whereas ifMj = 1, then to unveil a = 0 (resp., a = 1), she
must claim |ψj〉 = |1〉 (resp., |ψj〉 = |+〉), in view of Eq.
(11). Therefore, Bob’s scrambiling action is necessary, in
addition to his bit and basis randomizing actions.
Given the exponentially large number of ways to per-
mute the qubits, with Bob’s bit, basis and position ran-
domization in step (C2)P2, Alice is fully uncertain about
which of the four states |0〉 , |1〉 , |±〉 is each qubit |φj〉,
even given her preparation information of |ψj〉. There-
fore, Alice is constrained to execute the measurements
in (C5)P2 as per protocol and to announce a honest M
at step (C6)P2. To cheat, at best she simply unveils the
wrong basis. This would be detected with probability
1
4 in view of Eq. (11), implying that her probability to
escape detection will be
(
3
4
)n
.
That Alice is forced to measure the qubit states |φj〉
in step (C5)P2 guarantees that protocol P2 carries a CC.
Therefore, it can be safely composed with other instances
of protocol P2 or other tasks in a larger application. Pro-
tocol P2 is our principal proposal for an experimental im-
plementation, though in practice the simplified (without
quantum memory) protocol P1 may suffice.
IV. PROTOCOL P3, AND THE REALITY OF
THE QUANTUM STATE
From a foundational (rather than cryptographic) per-
spective, we find it instructive to consider the following
protocol P3, which is a simple extension of protocol P2.
We will show that the security proof of P3 reduces to that
of P2, in the sense that the security of P2 guarantees that
of P3.
In the commit phase, the steps (C1)P3 through (C6)P3
are the same as the steps (C1)P2 through (C6)P2, respec-
tively, except: in (C3)P3, Bob additionally transmits
n
2
qubits, which are halves of singlets, to Alice; in (C5)P3,
in addition to all actions of (C5)P2 additionally Alice
measures the singlet-halves sent by Bob in the basis Z
or X basis, depending on whether each bit in the sec-
ond half of M is 0 or 1, respectively. The outcomes for
these measurements constitutes n2 -bit string M2; and in
(C6)P3, Alice transmits the first
n
2 bits of M as before
(denote this string by M1). Further, she transmits the
n
2
bits M2. Thus, Alice’s classical evidence E in this is the
set of two strings {M1,M2}.
Similar, the unveiling phase of protocol P3, the steps
(U1)P3 through (U3)P3 are the same as the steps (U1)P2
through (U3)P2, respectively, except: in (U1)P3, Alice
additionally transmits the remaining n2 bits of M ; in
(U3)P3, Bob checks that the outcomes M2 are compati-
ble with measuring his halves of the singlets in the bases
specified by these remaining bits of M .
Instead of a detailed proof of security of P3, it will
6suffice to show that its security proof reduces to that of
P2. In protocol P3, set n → 2n, and suppose that Alice
and Bob ignore the M2 part. Then, it is clear that the
resulting protocol is at least as secure as protocol P2 on
n bits. If P2 is secure (as we saw it is), then so is P3.
We wish to draw attention to the fact that M2 reaches
Bob at the end of the commit phase, entailing that the
singlet halves on his side are already “collapsed”.
We now remark on the physical interpretation of the se-
curity of P3, which is the main motivation behind its pro-
posal. In the standard Hilbert space formalism, when dis-
tant players Alice and Bob, mutually at rest, make mea-
surements on an entangled quantum state, such that Bob
measures after Alice in their common reference frame,
both agree that there is a spacelike update to the descrip-
tion of Bob’s state as a result of her measurement. How-
ever, Bob’s reduced density operator remains unchanged.
This situation lies at the heart of the dilemma regarding
whether Bob’s state’s changed status as a result of Al-
ice’s measurement is an objective transformation (i.e., a
genuine ontological change in the state of Nature) or a
subjective transformation (i.e., just a Bayesian update of
her knowledge) of his state.
Intriguingly, this familiar dilemma becomes less am-
biguous in the entanglement scenario of P3. Let Alice
and Bob be separated by a finite distance, and at rest in
each other’s reference frames. They have synchronized
their clocks, which keep the same time tA = tB ≡ t. In
their common coordinate system, the absolute past is de-
fined by the event set T − ≡ {(t,x) : t < 0}, the absolute
future by T + ≡ {(t,x) : t > 0} and the absolute present
by T 0 ≡ {(0,x)}. Further, let WB denote the world line
of Bob, and W−B ≡ T − ∩ WB, W+B ≡ T + ∩ WB, i.e.,
the past and future segments of Bob’s world line, and let
event W0B ≡ T 0 ∩WB.
In this frame, we denote by eA ≡ (0,0) the event of
Alice’s entanglement breaking (EB) via measurements on
singlet halves in step (C5)P3. In this instant, she knows
that she has “collapsed” –i.e., irreversibly prepared–
Bob’s state in favor of one particular commitment. We
denote this remote preparation event in WB by eB.
Is this preparation of Bob’s state at event eB an ob-
jective or subjective transformation? To answer this,
we shall employ an operational framework, i.e., one not
based on an ontological model, but simply on the inputs
and measured outputs of the communication involved.
First, we define a feature X associated with a system S
as operational if X can be described in terms of proba-
bilities for outcomes of quantum physical measurements.
Features that must refer to an ontological model for QM
aren’t operational. A transformation T is said to be ob-
jective if there is an operational feature X of system S
such that X is altered under T. Ordinary classical trans-
formations are manifestly objective, but this framework
allows a larger set of transformations to be character-
ized as objective. More precisely, it enlarges the set of
objective transformations to include not just detectable
transformations, but also its superset of verifiable trans-
formations. All classical transformations are detectable,
and hence also verifiable. (For example, if the color of a
classical objected turned from red to blue, this may be
verified, and indeed detected.) But, we shall find that
quantum theory allows verifiable transformations that
aren’t detectable.
We define an “EPR-certificate” as the 2 × n2 -bit out-
come and basis specification (namely, whether the basis
is Z or X) for a set of n2 -qubit pure states, that can pass
Bob’s check for outcome matching in step (U3)P3 with
complete certainty, in support of some commitment. In
the terminology of [30], the EPR-certificate associates an
“element of reality” to the commitment encoded in the
n
2 home qubits of Bob. Let p(a, C) denote the proba-
bility that a candidate EPR-certificate C can (upon be-
ing checked) pass the test in (U3)P3, and further, that
p∗(a) ≡ maxC p(a, C). Clearly, the probability p∗(a) so
defined is an operational feature associated with Bob’s
state.
Now, the security of protocol P3 implies that after
Alice’s EB event, there exists a specific EPR-certificate
for commitment a and none for a. Note that this is
so even though she doesn’t have the EPR-certificate’s
complete classical description. Thus, p∗(a|B) = 1 whilst
p∗(a|B) < 1, which entails that:
p∗(0|B) 6= p∗(1|B) (12)
where where the overline on B indicates negation, and
B is the statement asserting that Alice executed an EB
in step (C5)P3. (We shall ignore the effect of noise, since
we are concerned with the situation in principle.)
When Alice hasn’t yet executed this step, she knows
that her choice is uncorrelated with Bob’s preparation in
the strong sense that there aren’t any EPR-certificates
in the universe. Thus,
p∗(0|B) = p∗(1|B). (13)
Bob’s state is symmetric with respect to both possible
commitments. This symmetry is also consistent with the
assumption of Alice’s free will, in that her choice is un-
related to Bob’s preparation.
In the present framework, Eqs. (12) and (13) together
imply that that Alice’s EB measurement induces an ob-
jective transformation of Bob’s state, whereby the orig-
inal symmetry in Bob’s state with respect to both com-
mitments gets verifiably broken.
The objective nature of the symmetry breaking event
eB signifies that Alice’s remote preparation must corre-
spond to a definite spacetime event on Bob’s world line.
Where to position eB on Bob’s world line? From Alice’s
perspective, in view of the constraints imposed by Eqs.
(12) and (13), eB must be identified precisely with W0B
(see Figure 1), which is spacelike separated from eA.
Observers in relative motion with respect to Alice may
make other claims, complicating the picture, to which we
return in Section IVB. Now, consider an alternative to
the above scenario, as seen in the Alice/Bob reference
frame.
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FIG. 1. Committer Alice and recipient Bob are distant ob-
servers at rest in each other’s reference frame. The two verti-
cal lines denote their respective worldlines. Alice’s free choice
of bit a at the EB event eA = (0,0) prepares Bob’s system at
event eB on his world line. Possible locations of eB include
W0B (in Alice’s present), e
↑
B
(in the causal future) and e↓
B
(in
the causal past).
A. Forward-time influence
Suppose eB is positioned later on his worldline (region
W+B ), say at e↑B, which is lightlike or timelike separated
from eA. Then, there is a worldline segment ω↑ between
W0B and e↑B (Figure 1) for which neither Eq. (12) nor Eq.
(13) would hold true. This would correspond to a break-
down in quantum correlations (cf. [31]), and in general
lead to violation of conservation laws for spin angular
momentum, etc. The possibility of such breakdown is
experimentally ruled out by data from loophole-free Bell
inequality violation tests [32].
Barring retrocausality (discussed below in Section
IVB), Alice thus concludes that her remote preparation
of Bob’s state is associated with a spacelike influence oc-
curing across the interval d→ (Figure 1). There is no
overt conflict with relativistic no-signaling, since Bob
can’t unilaterally detect this influence at eB , but can
only verify it later on. Worded differently, this superlu-
minal influence corresponds to a verifiable signal, but not
a detectable signal.
We denote by VS (“verifiable-signaling”) the set of two-
party protocols, such as P3, which permit a verifiable
signal. For protocols in this class, one can construct a
“causal story” at the operational level. In the story asso-
ciated with P3, Alice is the sender and Bob the receiver.
A class of two-party protocols that is strictly weaker is
S
VS
XS
FIG. 2. The containments among different classes of two-
party protocols, S (detectable-signaling), VS (verifiable-
signaling) andXS (extension-signaling). Special relativity ex-
cludes class S. Protocols in VS admit an operational “causal
story”, whereas those in XS\VS don’t. The classes S, VS
and XS may be considered as signaling analogues of the com-
putational complexity classes P, NP and PSPACE.
the set of tests of nonlocality in quantum mechanics or
general non-signaling probability theories. Here, the cor-
relations don’t admit a “clean” causal story in the sense
that there is no unequivocal case for a definite time or-
dering behind the observed correlations (cf. [33]). At
best, one can show that nonlocal correlations observed
in these protocols, if “extended” to a more determinis-
tic ontological model, would entail signaling at the ontic
level (with no preference for Alice or Bob in regard to the
direction of causation) [34]. These protocols constitute
the class XS, or “extension-signaling”.
A strictly stronger class than VS is the set of two-party
protocols in any of which Bob can unilaterally detect dis-
tant Alice’s input. These protocols are denoted S (for
“detectable-signaling”, or simply, “signaling”). Obviously,
protocols S are prohibited by both QM and special rela-
tivity when Alice’s and Bob’s measurements are spacelike
separated.
The containments among these classes of two-party
protocols are depicted in Figure 2. It may be helpful to
think of S, VS and XS as signaling analogues of the com-
putational complexity classes P (the class of efficiently
solvable decision problems), NP (the class of decision
problems that are efficiently verifiable) and PSPACE
(the class of problems solvable in polynomial amount of
storage space) [35], respectively.
The verifiable signal in a VS protocol, since it causes
an objective transformation of Bob’s state, requires a
causal channel to mediate it. (If the transformation
were only subjective, then clearly there is no such re-
quirement.) However, relativistic causality forbids any
dynamic mechanism being responsible for it. We are
thus led to conclude that the quantum state vector it-
self, whose reduction forms the basis for predicting the
remote preparation, must supply this causal channel. In
this sense, the state vector is a real entity.
Some points are worth noting here. Firstly, observe
8that we deduce the reality of the quantum state appeal-
ing only to operational criteria, and without recourse to
an ontological framework [36]. Secondly, our argument
for the reality of the quantum state didn’t require quan-
tum nonlocality but only quantum teleportation, which
is a weaker resource. Indeed, local entangled quantum
states can still teleport above the classical fidelity thresh-
old [37]. Thirdly, the essence of our argument could be
couched in a teleportation setting without invoking bit
commitment. The latter mainly serves to provide a situ-
ation that is amenable in this framework for defining the
objectivity of Alice’s remote preparation of Bob’s state.
In regard to the second point above, verifiable signaling
can be shown to occur even in a theory without nonlo-
cality, but permitting teleportation, such as Spekkens’
toy theory [13], where the state of a particle can be mod-
elled epistemically (i.e., as a probability distribution over
certain ontic elements). It can be shown that both the
steering-based attack on bit commitment in the standard
framework [12], as well as our solution to this problem
via protocols P1, P2 and P3, are possible in this toy
theory. Our above argument for the reality of the state
vector, adapted to a toy version of protocol P3, isn’t con-
tradicted by the epistemicity of the toy state, but rather
implies that Alice’s choice at eA produces a remote ontic
disturbance at eB, i.e., a remote disturbance in the ontic
elements underlying Bob’s state.
B. Retrocausal influence
Backward-time influence has been considered as a vi-
able alternative to superluminal influence because it of-
fers attractive features like time-symmetry, Lorentz in-
variance and retaining local-realism [38–40]. In the
present situation, note that the forward-time and also
the simultaneous (in the reference frame of Alice/Bob)
spacelike influence, discussed in Section IVA, would lead
certain observers in relative motion to Alice to expect a
breakdown in quantum correlations of the type discussed
above or in [31]. These are observers in whose reference
frame events in the segment ω↓ happen before eA. To
prevent this, one can posit that these causal influences
are transmitted through a wider future cone than the fu-
ture light-cone, but the required “speed of information”
would have to be several orders faster than light speed to
account for current experimental verification of quantum
nonlocal correlations (cf. [31], and references therein).
But, if one swallows the bitter pill of backward-time
causation, then a covariant solution to avoid predicting
a breakdown of nonlocal correlations in any reference
frame, is to further broaden this “wider causal cone” un-
til it coincides with the past light-cone rooted at eA, so
that the verifiable signal is transmitted (or, state vec-
tor “collapses”) along the boundary of event eA’s causal
past [41]. In the context of protocol P3, eB would be
positioned backward on Bob’s worldline at e↓B on WB
which is lightlike separated from eA (Figure 1). This
has the effect of extending the domain of validity of Eq.
(12) backwards to include the region ω↓. However, the
protocol classes in Figure 2 carry over, though with the
“signaling” in the context of VS and XS should be un-
derstood as retrocausal influences.
Such retrocausality would infringe on the definition of
Alice’s free will, since it would imply that Bob’s ensemble
in the causal past is correlated with Alice’s choice. Pre-
sumably, one can try to redefine free will in this situation
to exclude such correlations from its definition.
If we accept this retrocausal model, then one can pre-
sumably imagine some dynamic effect propagating at
light-speed backward in time from eA and preparing
Bob’s state at e↓B, and the above argument for attribut-
ing reality to the quantum state, no longer holds. Hence,
we require the assumption of absence of retrocausality
to arrive at our conclusion of the reality of the quantum
state.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSIONS
The no-go theorem for quantum bit commitment
(QBC) in the standard non-relativistic framework is a
consequence of the fact that Alice can exploit quantum
steering to unveil either commit bit on Bob’s system, if he
can’t distinguish the mixtures corresponding to the two
commitments [7–9]. However, various authors have ques-
tioned whether this framework is general enough to cover,
and thus rule out, all possibilities for QBC [15, 16, 18, 20].
In line with this argument, here we identify two assump-
tions implicit in the standard framework: (a) that Alice’s
submitted evidence exists in an ensemble known to her;
and (b) that E is a quantum– and not a classical– system.
Relaxing the assumption (a), we construct a QBC pro-
tocol (named “P1”), whose security against the steering-
based attack arises from the fact that Alice is unable
to determine the malicious steering operator U . How-
ever, protocol P1 still allows Alice to attack probabilis-
tically, and as a result, P1 lacks “certification of classi-
cality” (CC) [23], in common with various relativistic bit
commitment protocols [1–3, 5, 6].
Relaxing the second assumption above, we present
a second protocol (named “P2”) that is secure in the
stronger sense of also guaranteeing CC. Because the
submitted evidence is classical, there trivially exists
no malicious steering operator U and furthermore, the
superposition-based probabilistic attack is impossible. In
both protocols, security against simpler attacks makes
use of the single-blindness or double-blindness feature
through the use of randomization of the state by quantum
encryption, particle rearrangement, etc. Protocol P2 is
most suitable for experimental implementation, though
the quantum-memory-less variant of protocol P1 may be
practically sufficient.
Finally, we propose a third protocol (named “P3”),
which relaxes both assumptions in a teleportation set-
ting, and is motivated for a foundational purpose. Here,
9the role of entanglement and teleportation in protocol
P3 is vital for the argument of the reality of the quan-
tum state. Alice’s free will and the protocol’s secu-
rity are invoked to argue that her remote preparation
of Bob’s system is an objective transformation in the
weaker sense that she produces a verifiable preparation
of Bob’s state (leading to cryptographic security), rather
than in the stronger sense of being unilaterally detectable
(which would have led to superluminal signaling). It is
argued that, barring retrocausality, this remote objective
transformation entails a superluminal influence which,
by virtue of relativistic causality, can’t be pinned down
on any dynamical mechanism. This is used as the basis
to argue for the objectivity of Alice’s remote preparation,
and hence for the reality of the quantum state.
All our protocols are conceptually and experimentally
simple. They allow for a holding phase of an indefinite
time period even with current technology, in contrast to
the relativistic BC protocols [1–3, 5, 6], which require
an increasingly complex, continued and carefully timed
communication to extend the holding phase (the current
experimental record being 24 hours).
Finally, it is hoped that our results open up new pos-
sibilities in mistrustful quantum cryptography, in partic-
ular, highlighting the difficulty in– and consequent care
needed for– determining the full scope of the most gen-
eral framework appropriate to mistrustful quantum cryp-
tography. It also uncovers a basic relationship between
secrecy and the nature of physical laws, which would be
useful for devising cryptographic axioms to derive quan-
tum mechanics.
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Appendix A: State of the evidence
We conservatively assume that all states |φ(a)j 〉 for a
given a are identical, say |0〉. Under the stated assump-
tions, Alice’s evidence is in the state
ρaB = CW
[
(|0〉 〈0|)⊗n ⊗
[
I
2
]⊗Q]
,
=

2Q+n − n∑
j=1
(
Q+ n
Q+ j
)
−1
I
∗
=

2Q+n − n−1∑
j=0
(
Q+ n
j
)
−1
I
∗
(A1)
where I∗ is the density matrix in the Hilbert space
H⊗(Q+n)2 of 2Q+n qubits, which is diagonal and equal-
weighted in the computational basis, with precisely the
components with Hamming weight greater than Q van-
ishing.
For a fixed integer t, and integer T →∞, the truncated
binomial series satisfies the bound [42]:
lim
T→∞
(
T
t
)−1 t∑
j=0
(
T
j
)
=
(
T
t
)
+
(
T
t−1
)
+
(
T
t−2
)
+ . . .(
T
t
)
= 1 +
t
T − t+ 1 +
t(t− 1)
(T − t+ 1)(T − t+ 2) + · · ·
≤ 1 + t
T − t+ 1 +
(
t
T − t+ 1
)2
+ · · ·
=
T − t+ 1
T − 2t+ 1 . (A2)
Setting T ≡ n+Q and t ≡ n− 1 here, one finds
n−1∑
j=0
(
n+Q
j
)
≤
(
n+Q
n− 1
)
Q+ 2
Q− n+ 3 . (A3)
Substrituting this in Eq. (A1), we find that, for large
Q ≫ n, the number of non-vanishing entries in I∗ is
bounded below by υ(Q,n) ≡ 2Q+n − (n+Qn−1) Q+2Q−n+3 ≈
2Q+n − (Q+nn−1) ≈ 2Q+n − 2(Q+n)H(n/Q) = 2Q+n(1 −
2−(Q+n)[1−H(n/Q)], where the Stirling approximation(
N
Np
) ≈ NH(p), has been used.
The fidelity between states ρ and σ is given by
Tr(
√√
σρ
√
σ. Setting σ ≡ 2−(Q+n)I and ρ ≡ ρaB in
Eq. (A1) in the above approximation, we have fidelity
F (Q,n) = 2−(Q+n)/2Tr(
√
ρaB) & 2
−(Q+n)/2√υ(Q,n),
from which, one obtains Eq. (5).
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